So Even If It’s Not a Milchemes Mitzvah, Is There a Halachic Obligation to Fight in the Wars?

Set the milchemes mitzvah question aside entirely and ask the harder one: is a Jew nonetheless obligated to fight in the State's wars? The answer the Gedolim have given — in letters, in seforim, and in the roshei yeshiva's rulings of the past two years — is no. The Jew whose Torah is his life fulfills his obligation through that Torah, which the Gemara calls the nation's protection; and the one who is not learning is directed not to the army but to honest work, for the army's spiritual danger lies in the framework itself. The saving of life in immediate danger binds every Jew without exception — but that is pikuach nefesh, not the institutional framework whose claim this is.

In our companion article, we set out why the wars of the State of Israel are not a milchemes mitzvah in the formal, binding sense that is claimed for them. The natural next question — pressed in every Knesset debate and every editorial demanding Charedi enlistment — is the one we take up here: fine; set the milchemes mitzvah designation aside entirely. Is there still some other halachic obligation that requires a Jew to fight in these wars?

The Gedolei HaPoskim of the past century examined this question directly, and their answer was no. That answer does not rest on a single argument but on several, woven together, and it has been confirmed, in writing, by the contemporary Torah leadership as recently as the past two years. We set the case out below.

I. The Heart of It: Toraso Umanuso

Begin where the Gedolim begin — not with war at all, but with the role of the ben Torah, because that is what decides the question.

The Rambam, in his halachic code, establishes that the one whose life is given to Torah occupies a structurally different place in Klal Yisrael. Writing of the tribe of Levi — set apart from the ordinary burdens of the nation for the service of Hashem — he extends the principle far beyond Levi: "And not Levi alone, but every single individual whose spirit moves him and whose understanding gives him to set himself apart, to stand before Hashem to serve Him… behold, this person has been consecrated as the holy of holies, and Hashem will be his portion and inheritance forever" (Hilchos Shemittah V'Yovel 13:13). This is not a homily; it is the Rambam in the middle of paskening halacha, defining a category of Jew whose obligations regarding the material and physical burdens of the nation are not the same as everyone else's, because his assigned avodah is different.

It is precisely on this foundation that the Charedi exemption rests. Rav Shach, the recognized leader of Lithuanian Jewry for a generation, anchored the deferment of yeshiva students in the principle that Torah is their sole occupation — toraso umanuso. This is the framework in a phrase. For the Jew whose Torah is genuinely his life's work, there is no obligation to leave it for the army, because his Torah is the obligation — the avodah the Rambam describes, the contribution the Torah itself asks of him. The exemption was never a loophole or a dodge; it is the recognition of a role. We return below to the case of the one who is not in that category — and, as we will see, the answer there leads away from the army as well, not toward it.

II. Torah Magna U'Matzla — He Is Not Evading; He Is Protecting

The objection comes at once: even granting his role is Torah, is he not simply sheltering while others bleed for him? Here the Gemara answers in a way that the Charedi world has stood upon for two thousand years.

The Talmud teaches: "A mitzvah, while one is engaged in it, protects and saves; while one is not engaged in it, it protects but does not save. Torah — both while one is engaged in it and while one is not — protects and saves" (Sotah 21a). This is not poetry; it is a halachic statement about how the world is governed. Torah operates as an active mechanism of protection over Klal Yisrael, unique among the mitzvos. On this understanding — which is the Torah's own — the ben Torah in the beis medrash is not hiding behind the soldier; he is part of what shields him. He is doing the work the Torah assigns precisely to him, and that work is itself a defense of the nation.

This is exactly what the Chazon Ish told David Ben-Gurion, to his face, in their famous meeting of October 1952. When Ben-Gurion pressed that the soldiers at the borders protect the yeshivos, and asked whether that was not itself the decisive mitzvah, the Chazon Ish answered that it is in the merit of the Torah being learned that Klal Yisrael lives and is protected — that the Torah is the tree of life, and that the soldiers are guarded by the Torah of the bnei yeshiva, not the reverse. (The exchange is recorded by those present as the substance of the meeting.) One may accept this framework or reject it — but one cannot, while pretending to represent the Torah's own view, dismiss it, for it is written in the Gemara. And if it is true, then pulling the learner from the beis medrash does not add to the nation's protection; it subtracts from it.

III. Self-Endangerment, and Who Is Obligated to Enter It

There is a further halachic principle in play, and it must be stated with care, because it is easy to overstate.

The Torah forbids a Jew to place himself in needless danger: "Take exceeding care of your souls" (Devarim 4:9, 4:15), from which the Rambam derives a positive obligation to guard one's life and remove every danger from it (Hilchos Rotzeach U'Shmiras Nefesh 11:4–5), codified in the Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 427; Yoreh Deah 116). Self-endangerment is not a neutral act; it requires a halachic justification.

Now, let us be honest about what this does and does not prove. It does not prove that fighting is forbidden — for the saving of Jewish life is itself the justification the Torah recognizes, and a soldier defending Jews against those who would murder them is engaged in hatzalas nefashos, which permits and at times requires entering danger. To claim that combat as such violates the prohibition of self-endangerment would prove far too much; it would forbid every soldier, which is absurd and is not the Charedi claim. What the principle does establish is narrower and exactly to the point: a Jew is not required to enter mortal danger where no obligation places him there. And for the ben Torah — whose role is Torah, and whose absence from a front that is amply manned without him changes nothing on the battlefield — there is no obligation that compels him into the danger. The burden lies on those who would pull him from the beis medrash into mortal risk to show that the Torah requires it of him; and that burden, as we have seen, they cannot carry. He may not be casually fed into danger his role does not demand — and the Torah's care for his life, absent an obligation overriding it, weighs on the side of the beis medrash.

IV. The Documented Mesorah Across the Generations

This is not a position assembled yesterday to meet a political moment. It is a written mesorah, transmitted across four generations of Gedolim, and the seforim are on the shelf to be opened.

The Brisker Rav, Rav Yitzchok Zev Soloveitchik, held an uncompromising position that yeshiva students must not be drafted from their learning into the army's framework — a position recorded at length by his talmidim (in Uvdos V'Hanhagos L'Beis Brisk and Peninei Rabbeinu HaGriz) and rooted in his profound opposition to subordinating the Torah world to the secular state. The Steipler Gaon, Rav Yaakov Yisrael Kanievsky — who had himself served in the Russian army in the First World War, keeping Shabbos and kashrus through extraordinary mesirus nefesh — wrote repeatedly, in Krayna D'Igrasa, of the spiritual danger of military service, warning from his own experience what the military environment does to a young Jew who lacks the protective framework of full-time Torah and a chevra of bnei Torah; his concern was not only the danger to the body but the deeper danger to the soul. And Rav Elchonon Wasserman, Hy"d, in Kovetz Maamarim and Ikvesa D'Meshicha, set out the underlying ideological objection — that a national project advanced as the expression of secular Jewish nationalism, offered as a substitute for Torah-defined Jewish peoplehood, cannot generate Torah obligations upon Jews who reject that ideology at its root. (Rav Elchonon was murdered in 1941 and addressed the ideology of Zionism rather than the IDF as such; the seforim cited record positions and themes rather than serving as verified verbatim rulings on contemporary conscription.)

These are real, locatable seforim, written across the generations — not slogans, and not inventions. The position they transmit is one and the same: the Jew whose life is Torah fulfills his obligation through that Torah, and the framework of the secular army is not the vehicle through which his duty to Klal Yisrael is discharged.

V. The Contemporary Gedolim — The Same Answer, in Our Own Day

And lest anyone imagine this is a fossil of an earlier era, the Torah leadership of our own day has said precisely the same thing, in response to precisely the present pressure.

At gatherings of dozens of Lithuanian roshei yeshiva — convened specifically to address the post-October-7 campaign to draw Charedim into army "tracks" tailored, supposedly, to religious observance — the Gedolim issued sharply worded letters opposing enlistment even in those frameworks. Their stated ground was concrete and damning: that "these arrangements regrettably do not endure over time despite promises and commitments" — that the spiritual safety the army promises the religious soldier is not, in fact, delivered, and the accumulated evidence of decades is that it cannot be delivered within the army's structure. Rav Moshe Hillel Hirsch, Rosh Yeshiva of Slabodka, stated it without softening: "All these tracks are an integral part of the army, and anyone who goes there places himself under military authority and becomes a full soldier. There is no basis whatsoever to permit this." And Rav Dov Lando, one of the leading poskim of the generation, added in his own hand: "Beyond the personal harm he brings upon himself and his family, others may be drawn after him, and his sin is exceedingly grave."

This is a named, sourced, contemporary psak — published in the open press and signed by the leading Torah authorities alive today. The position of the Gedolim of this hour is identical to that of the Chazon Ish, the Brisker Rav, Rav Shach, and the Steipler. The seforim are still on the shelf; the roshei yeshiva are still ruling; and the answer has not changed.

VI. What This Means in Practice

Read together, the halachic record yields a clear and honest set of answers — and honesty requires distinguishing three different cases rather than blurring them into one.

For the yeshiva student whose Torah is his sole occupation, there is no halachic obligation to fight in the State's wars. His Torah is his role and his contribution; the principle of toraso umanuso governs the question entirely, and the Gedolim across every generation have ruled it so.

For the Jew who is not engaged in serious full-time learning, the Charedi position is emphatically not that he should therefore go to the army — and this point is so often misrepresented that it must be stated plainly. The spiritual danger of the army, in the Charedi understanding, lies in the framework itself, not in the caliber of the individual within it; it is no safer for the weaker young man than for the stronger one, and in truth more perilous, for he is the less insulated. Rav Shach's guidance pointed such a young man not toward the army but toward genuine Torah or, failing that, honest work within a life of yiras Shamayim — never toward a setting the Torah world regards as destructive to Yiddishkeit. And the Gedolim of our own day have ruled exactly this, in the clearest terms: the Moetzes Chachmei HaTorah declared that "even one who does not learn in yeshiva is forbidden to go to any track in the army," and the Lithuanian roshei yeshiva have opposed enlistment even in the tailored "Charedi tracks." The answer for the one who is not learning full-time is a Torah-faithful path to a livelihood and a productive life — for the reasons we have developed across this series — and not the army.

And for the saving of life in immediate danger, every Jew is obligated — always, and without exception. If a terrorist breaks into a building, every Jew present is bound to act to save Jewish life. The Charedi world has never disputed this for a moment, and it lives it: mishmar ezrachi civil-defense units operate in Bnei Brak, Beitar, Elad, Modiin Illit, and Kiryat Sefer, often in coordination with the security forces; Hatzalah and ZAKA run toward every scene of horror; bochurim sit at the bedsides of the wounded. The defense of Jewish life is not the question, and never was. The question is only whether the secular army's institutional framework, in its present form, generates the formal obligation its advocates claim — and the documented answer of the Torah leadership, across four generations and into the present day, is that it does not.

VII. The Closing Position

So — even setting the milchemes mitzvah question aside, is there a halachic obligation to fight in the State's wars?

For the ben Torah whose Torah is his life, the answer of the Gedolim is a clear and documented no. The Torah does not require him to abandon the avodah it assigned him — the avodah that is itself, the Gemara teaches, the protection of his people — for a danger that the nation is meeting amply without him. His learning is not an escape from the burden; it is his share of it. For the one outside full-time learning, the path runs likewise away from a framework that the Gedolim, in our own day, have ruled cannot keep its promises to his soul — toward honest work and a life of Torah, not toward the army. And for the saving of life in the moment of danger, every Jew stands obligated, and the Torah world stands ready, as it always has.

The seforim are on the shelf. The roshei yeshiva are still ruling. The question has been asked, and asked, and asked again — and the answer, from the Chazon Ish to Rav Dov Lando, has remained the same. Until the day when the Beis HaMikdash is rebuilt and the conditions of Klal Yisrael's national life are restored under the Torah, the Torah world continues the avodah it was actually given — learning, davening, raising Jewish families, defending Jewish life when the moment demands it, and sustaining Klal Yisrael through the means the Torah itself calls its protection.

May the Guardian of Israel watch over all His people — those who learn and those who stand in harm's way alike — and bring the day when no Jew need raise a sword against any enemy, bimheirah b'yameinu, amen.

Sources

The heart of it — toraso umanuso

• Rambam, Hilchos Shemittah V'Yovel 13:13 — the structural category of Levi and of every individual consecrated to the service of Hashem, set apart from the ordinary burdens of the nation; the halachic foundation of the toraso umanuso framework
• Rav Elazar Menachem Man Shach — the deferment of yeshiva students anchored in Torah being one's sole occupation (toraso umanuso); preserved in Michtavim u'Maamarim — the exemption tied specifically to genuine full-time learning

Torah magna u'matzla

• Talmud Bavli, Sotah 21a — that a mitzvah protects and saves while one is engaged in it, but Torah protects and saves always — Torah as an active mechanism of national protection
• The Chazon Ish to Ben-Gurion (October 1952) — that it is in the merit of Torah study that Klal Yisrael lives and is protected — presented as the documented substance of the meeting as recorded by those present, not a verbatim transcript

Self-endangerment, and who is obligated to enter it

• Devarim 4:9, 4:15 ("take exceeding care of your souls"); Rambam, Hilchos Rotzeach U'Shmiras Nefesh 11:4–5; Shulchan Aruch, Choshen Mishpat 427 and Yoreh Deah 116 — the prohibition of needless self-endangerment and the obligation to guard one's life — presented honestly: this does not forbid combat as such (the saving of life justifies the danger), but establishes that one is not required to enter mortal danger where no obligation places him there

The documented mesorah across the generations

• The Brisker Rav (Rav Yitzchok Zev Soloveitchik) — the uncompromising position against drafting bnei Torah from their learning, recorded in Uvdos V'Hanhagos L'Beis Brisk and Peninei Rabbeinu HaGriz — presented as his documented position; the shalosh shevuos is not attributed to him as the basis, that argument being centrally the Satmar Rav's
• The Steipler Gaon (Rav Yaakov Yisrael Kanievsky), who served in the Russian army in the First World War — his warnings on the spiritual danger of military service in Krayna D'Igrasa — presented as documented themes
• Rav Elchonon Wasserman Hy"d, Kovetz Maamarim and Ikvesa D'Meshicha — the ideological objection to secular Jewish nationalism as a substitute for Torah-defined peoplehood — noting that he was murdered in 1941 and addressed the ideology rather than the IDF as such

The contemporary Gedolim, and the non-learner

• The letters of the Lithuanian roshei yeshiva opposing enlistment even in tailored "Charedi tracks" (such as "Kodkod" and "Ma'alot Tzur"), on the ground that "these arrangements regrettably do not endure over time despite promises and commitments"; Rav Moshe Hillel Hirsch ("All these tracks are an integral part of the army… there is no basis whatsoever to permit this") and Rav Dov Lando ("beyond the personal harm he brings upon himself and his family, others may be drawn after him, and his sin is exceedingly grave") — documented public statements (Israel National News; VINnews, 2024–2026)
• The Moetzes Chachmei HaTorah ruling that "even one who does not learn in yeshiva is forbidden to go to any track in the army" (2024) — establishing that the Charedi position directs even the non-learner away from the army, toward genuine Torah or honest work, and not toward enlistment
• Note on sourcing: this article does not adopt the claim — advanced by some critics — that Rav Shach held non-learners should enlist; his documented framework ties the exemption to genuine learning, and the Torah leadership's explicit position, then and now, directs the non-learner to honest work rather than the army. The specific vocalized passages circulated as direct quotations of Rav Shach on this point are not reproduced here as verbatim citations, their precise source in Michtavim u'Maamarim not being established; the position is rested instead on the documented rulings above

What this means in practice

• The honest three-fold distinction: no obligation for the full-time learner (toraso umanuso); for the non-learner, the direction toward honest work rather than the army, the army's spiritual danger lying in the framework itself (developed in "Why Does the Charedi World Frown on 'Charedi' IDF Programs?", "Does Hesder Prove You Can Both Learn and Serve?", and "Until When Will You Keep Protecting Them?"); and the universal, unconditional obligation of pikuach nefesh in immediate danger — lived through mishmar ezrachi, Hatzalah, and ZAKA

The structural relationship to other articles in this series

• "Are the Wars of the State of Israel a Milchemes Mitzvah?" — the companion article, setting aside which this one proceeds
• "What Would Happen If No One Fought?" and "Do We See the Miracles?" — Torah as the protection of the nation
• "Why Is Torah Learning the Top Priority?" — the value of the Torah the learner is asked to abandon
• "Why Does the Charedi World Frown on 'Charedi' IDF Programs?" — the broken promises of the tailored frameworks