Do Charedim Love the Land as Much as the Biggest Zionists?

Last updated on 25 Aug 2025

It’s a provocative question. Maybe even a painful one. You’ll hear it from time to time:

“If Charedim don’t call themselves Zionists, can they really love Eretz Yisrael as much as the Zionists do?”

Let’s not flinch from this. Let’s answer it honestly—with humility, with facts, and with heart.

Because the truth is: Charedim may not carry the same labels—but their love for the Land runs just as deep, and in many cases, even deeper.

To understand this properly, we need to explore how that love is expressed across different groups—beginning with religious Zionists, and then turning to secular Zionists, both historically and today.

Charedim and Religious Zionists: Two Loves, Different Lenses

Among religious Zionists, love for the Land is often wrapped in ideological language—Eretz Yisrael as the beginning of the Geulah, a fulfillment of Divine promise, and a manifestation of Hashem’s guiding hand in modern history. They see the State of Israel, with all its complexities, as a vehicle of redemption.

Their love for the Land is passionate, idealistic, and tied to the vision of Torah flourishing within a sovereign Jewish nation.

Charedim share that love for the Land—but without assigning religious meaning to the political structures of the modern State. In other words:

Religious Zionists may say, “The State is holy.”
Charedim say, “The Land is holy—even if the State is not.”

Both deeply love Eretz Yisrael. But the Charedi love is quieter. Less tied to nationalism. More rooted in Torah, in tefillah, in yearning for Hashem’s presence to return—not through political milestones, but through Moshiach and the rebuilding of the Beis HaMikdash.

And unlike some religious Zionists who feel torn or conflicted when the State acts against Torah, Charedim never mistake the two. They can love the Land without idolizing the government.

Their love is pure. Deep. Unconditional.

What About Secular Zionists? A Complicated History of Disconnected Love

Now this is where the contrast becomes sharper.

Historically, many early secular Zionists did not love Eretz Yisrael for its holiness. They wanted a homeland—not necessarily this homeland.

Theodor Herzl, in his early writings, proposed establishing a Jewish state in Uganda, Argentina, or anywhere else that would provide safety for the Jewish people.¹
The Uganda Proposal, officially presented at the Sixth Zionist Congress in 1903, was seriously considered by the secular Zionist leadership. Herzl himself said, *“We are not going to Palestine; we are going to the land that will give us what we need.”*²

That was not love of the Land. It was love of Jewish survival—a noble goal, but one not rooted in Torah or in Eretz Yisrael as the Divinely chosen Land.

Even today, many secular Zionist leaders express a very different kind of attachment:

It’s not uncommon to hear Israeli politicians speak about “a state for all its citizens,” separating Judaism from the Jewish state.
Since the 1990s, many secular Zionists have led efforts to surrender parts of Eretz Yisrael in the hope of peace. Oslo. Disengagement. Land for peace. Gush Katif, where Torah Jews built beautiful communities with blood and sweat, was uprooted—by a Zionist government.
Yitzhak Rabin, Ehud Barak, Ehud Olmert, Ariel Sharon, Yair Lapid, and others supported or enacted policies that involved handing over sacred parts of the Land to sworn enemies of the Jewish people.
Today, secular leaders routinely speak about giving away parts of Yehuda and Shomron (Judea and Samaria)—not because they don’t know it’s ours, but because it doesn’t matter to them.

For many in that camp, Eretz Yisrael is not inherently holy—it’s negotiable. It’s land, not legacy. Territory, not Torah.

That’s not love. That’s practicality. That’s politics.

Charedi Love: Rooted in Torah, Not Nationalism

Charedim may not wave the Zionist banner, but their love for Eretz Yisrael is often more unwavering and more uncompromising than those who do.

They never entertained Uganda.
They never suggested giving up Chevron or Yericho or the Old City.
They kiss the Land, not debate its borders.

Their love is expressed in tefillah, in mesirus nefesh, in building Torah in the Land despite hardship and hostility.

They don’t chant slogans. They build yeshivos. They raise families in cramped apartments in Beitar and Beit Shemesh, choosing ruchniyus over comfort—just to live in the Land that Hashem gave us.

And that’s a love no politician can manufacture.

So Who Loves It More?

That’s not for us to judge. Love is hard to measure. But this much is clear:

Charedim love Eretz Yisrael with a spiritual love, rooted in the Torah, the Avos, and the promise of redemption.
Religious Zionists love it as the center of their religious-national vision, and many live here with deep dedication to Torah values.
Secular Zionists, while historically crucial in returning the Jewish people to the Land, often showed—and still show—a willingness to detach the Land from its spiritual meaning, or even to trade it away.

So if we’re asking, “Do Charedim love Eretz Yisrael as much as the biggest Zionists?”

The answer is: They do. And often, even more.

Because their love isn’t conditional. It’s not ideological. It’s not dependent on politics or safety or international approval.

It’s a love that says:

“This Land is holy because Hashem gave it to us. And no one—not a king, not a president, not a prime minister—can take that away.”

Sources & Footnotes

Theodor Herzl, The Jewish State (1896); Altneuland (1902) – Herzl’s early writings advocated for any refuge for Jews, not necessarily Eretz Yisrael.
Sixth Zionist Congress (1903) – Uganda Proposal introduced as a temporary solution to rising antisemitism in Russia; Herzl supported it initially.
Ramban, Hasagos to Sefer HaMitzvos, Asei #4 – Settling the Land is a Torah mitzvah, eternal and non-negotiable.
Rambam, Hilchos Terumos 1:1 – Eretz Yisrael alone is the land of mitzvos hateluyos ba’aretz.
Statements and policies by Israeli leaders – See public records of the Oslo Accords (1993), Gush Katif Disengagement (2005), and speeches by Israeli political leaders advocating for two-state solutions or withdrawal from parts of Yehuda v’Shomron.